














Philip Jessup would not be pleased. Exactly sixty years after he published his 
groundbreaking book on Transnational Law,
1
 a majority of voters in the United Kingdom 
decided they wanted none of that. By voting for the UK to leave the European Union, they 
rejected what may well be called the biggest and most promising project of transnational 
law. Indeed, the European Union (including its predecessor, the European Economic 
Community), is nearly as old Jessup’s book. Both are products of the same time. That 
invites speculation that goes beyond the immediate effects of Brexit: Is the time of 
transnational law over? Or can transnational law be renewed and revived? 
 
It is worth remembering that Brexit is not an isolated event of anti-transnationalism. The 
most successful transnational movement today is, ironically, nationalism. Nationalists and 
populists in other EU Member States hope to ride the Brexit wave and inaugurate their 
own exits in the name of national sovereignty: Italexit, Nexit and Frexit are more than just 
idle word games. The EU might well collapse. And such nationalism, often with clear racist 
tendencies, goes beyond Europe, and beyond states within organizations. In India, Modi 
has instituted a new Hindu nationalism. In Russia, Putin is deploying a cynical form of 
nationalism. And in the United States, Donald Trump has already suggested that his 
campaign is about “the exact same thing” as Brexit, namely taking the country back from 
cosmocrats and elites. This transnational nationalism is thus about more than just 
membership in the EU. It is a movement for national strength, for closed borders, for 
controlled or restricted trade. It wants to reestablish a traditional idea of a sovereign 
nation state. 
 
Leave voters have been called stupid, selfish, and xenophobic, among other things. Even if 
this were true (it clearly is for some, but not necessarily for all), this would not prove much. 
In a democracy everyone has the right to be stupid and also, up to a point, selfish and 
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xenophobic. This is not petty: we leave to democratic votes precisely those questions of 
politics that we do not feel we can decide objectively on a scientific basis, and we trust 
people to determine for themselves what is best for them. Whether membership in the EU 
should be open to a referendum is quite contestable. But once a referendum is called, it is 
not easy to reject the result and simultaneously celebrate democracy. The arguments must 
be taken seriously, even if we refuse to accept them. And they must inform our thinking 
about transnational law, even if we refuse to adopt them. 
 
Brexit as Rejection of Transnational Law 
 
Brexit must be understood as a rejection of transnational law because, in many ways, the 
European Unions is the epitome of transnationalism. Jessup himself, although primarily 
interested in Asia, acknowledged as much. When Transnational Law was first published, 
Jessup could only mention the European Coal and Steel Community, but he already 
rejoiced that it had “blazed a trail for supranational authorities.”
2
 In Transnational Law, 
Jessup famously defined transnational law “to include all law which regulates actions or 
events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are 
included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”
3
 This fit 
the new European Union quite well, as Jessup himself explained: 
 
The basic treaties are pure international law, as is the 
rule which makes these treaties binding—pacta sunt 
servanda. But the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities shows that to a great 
extent the law of the Communities is something 
different-something which I would call "transnational," 
which may be in part international law in the sense in 
which that term is used in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, and partly law which 




The core for our understanding of both Transnational Law and European Law (and, 
incidentally, also Brexit) is to understand their relation to the state and to national 
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sovereignty. For Jessup, states were, only one of many sets of actors, besides individuals, 
organizations and corporations, and also supranational organizations. Sovereignty, for him, 
did not disappear or become irrelevant, but it had become relative. Already, in a speech 
from 1942, Jessup said as much: “If we can remove the snobbery and the selfishness from 
our international thinking, really admitting that the principle of sovereignty is not a sacred 
and unlimited thing, we shall be well on our way toward true international democracy.”
5
 In 
Transnational Law, he argued that “in fact the sovereign’s power is neither exclusive nor 
absolute within its own territory, and that this is true whether one is talking in terms of 
legal or extralegal power.”
6
 He could have been speaking of the EU. Member States still 
play a role, but they are one set of actors between individuals and regions, on the one 
hand, and the supranational organization of the EU, on the other hand. Sovereignty does 
not disappear but it is shared, as in Neil MacCormick’s insightful analysis of constitutional 




The Brexit movement, in rejecting the EU, rejected quite precisely the transnational law 
character of the EU. Of course, this is not overt in every aspect. Sure, there was likely little 
desire among the Leavers to reestablish legal categories such as public and private law. It 
also seems unlikely that the Leave campaign was animated by the desire to reject the 
problem-based regulatory style of the EU.  What the campaign rejected, however, was the 
transnational character of EU law. Leavers want laws to be national. At its heart, Brexit 
represented a fundamentally legal concern: rules for Great Britain should be made by 
Great Britain and its institutions. This links lawmaking and sovereignty with the idealized 
sovereign state of 19
th
 century international law: a British population without foreigners, a 
firmly controlled territory controlled by closed borders, and a sovereign British 
government that need not share authority with Brussels.  And, remarkably, they also 
emphasize the fourth element named as a requirement for a state in international law: the 
ability to enter into relations with other states on its own terms. In other words, what the 
Leave-voters wanted was sovereignty, both in its internal and its external aspects: a 
Westphalian model of the world, in which states are internally sovereign, and in which 
international relations are exclusively dealt with as matters between states. 
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The Nostalgia of the Nation State 
 
Much of this desire is driven by nostalgia for a past that never was. There is the right-wing 
nostalgia for a Britain that was not only powerful and prosperous but also, by and large, 
white. Some of this is nostalgia for Empire, a nostalgia both unrealistic and abhorrent. 
More plausible is the nostalgia for the nation state. There is the left-wing nostalgia for a 
functioning welfare state, for a strong left that can actually improve workers conditions 
and can fight understandable fights with understandable enemies (workers against 
capitalists). This hope for a return to the nation state is misguided. There is no way back. 
The nation state in its 19
th
 century idealized form is a mirage, and self-regulation in 
isolation can no longer work. 
 
Start with the idea of sovereignty.  We know it to be a construct and a highly problematic 
one. Krasner has called it, with some justification, organized hypocrisy. Jessup made the 
point earlier, from a realist perspective: 
 
The very existence of a government of a state is a 
fiction, for a state is an intangible, and our international 
law picture of a sovereign state never had life. 
Sovereignty is essentially a concept of completeness. It 
is also a legal creation, and as such, is a paradox, if not 
an absolute impossibility, for if a state is a sovereign in 
the complete sense, it knows no law and therefore 
abolishes, at the moment of its creation, the jural 
creator which gave it being. All juristic persons, indeed, 
as Charles De Visscher has pointed out, are fictions 





But the idea of the state as the fundamental entity is problematic in other ways. Insofar as 
the dream of the Leavers is to go back to the nation state with a shared identity, the futility 
of the dream is showing, not least from the voting results. A country cannot be said to 
have a clear national identity if, in a referendum, it splits almost evenly on what that 
identity is. Indeed, the split is not random but tracks various societal differentiations: 
young versus old, urban versus rural, educated versus uneducated. The idea of one country 
with one identity and one national interest is refuted by the results of the very referendum 
that sought to reclaim the notion. 
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Indeed, the UK is one of the stranger models for a nation state, not least because it 
consists of several nations: besides England, there are Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted with significant majorities to remain in the 
EU. Both are now considering an exit from the UK in order to make that happen. The 
Leavers run into the familiar conundrum from international law discussions on secession 
and self-determination: if the UK can split from the EU, why should not Scotland split from 
the UK? Why is it wrong for Brussels to make rules for London, but right for London to 
make rules for Glasgow? Who is the self in self-governance? 
 
There is one answer, and it should not be dismissed out of hand.
9
 One might say that 
sovereignty does not require homogeneity of a shared identity. Quite the contrary: the 
state is that very institution that provides robust procedures to create decisions that can 
be accepted amongst diverse views. Nation states (especially the UK with its parliamentary 
supremacy) provide the relevant institutions for democratic decision-making. They have 
functioning parliaments, a functioning court system, a functioning government. And they 
have elected officials who can be held accountable. 
 
This seems plausible in theory but it has two shortcomings. First, it is not clear that voters 
actually accept decisions made under the procedures provided by the state; the 
referendum itself may be a test case. Second, and more importantly, it is not clear that the 
state’s institutions are particularly well-versed for transnational problems.  These 
institutions remain national in their setup and in their functioning. As they stand, these 
institutions are adequate for national, not transnational issues. 
 
This is where the second mirage becomes evident, the mirage of self-governance. When 
Jessup suggested that “the sovereign’s power is neither exclusive nor absolute within its 
own territory,” he expressed an important fact.  There are many issues that are effectively 
decided outside of the sovereign. There are issues on which states are almost bound to 
follow the demands from other states—not by law, but by necessity. Neighbors of the EU 
know of the need to enact EU legislation in order to be compatible. Even seemingly robust 
states strive to comply with EU data privacy standards in order to serve as “safe havens.” 
Poorer countries have even less choice. They have to enact certain product and labor 
standards in order to be allowed to export. They may have to grant foreign investors 
specific privileges. Their sovereignty is formal, but in effect they are regulated from 
elsewhere through economic pressures, even without the formalities of a system like the 
EU. Jessup knew about this interdependence. British proponents of Brexit, if they did not, 
will soon learn it.  
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Jessup’s focus, in positing transnational law, was especially on problems that transcend 
borders—which defines, at least traditionally, the limited competences of the EU. But 
Jessup already demonstrated that there is no clear boundary between domestic and 
transnational problems, and that traditional distinctions tend to be arbitrary.
10
 
Realistically, an increasing number of problems must be characterized as transnational, 
and it is not surprising therefore that the EU has claimed ever broader competences. Now, 
these transnational problems cannot be resolved through isolated self-regulation on the 
level of the nation state. By necessity, citizens in or from several countries are involved—
the very justification for regulation at the EU level. Immigration concerns, which seem to 
have been the biggest driver of the referendum’s outcome, show this nicely. Immigration 
control can be defined as a national problem, but that is artificial. Immigration is by 
definition a transnational problem: it concerns the immigration country, the emigration 
country, the refugees in transit between the two, and also other countries that will need to 
bear the costs of one country’s permissive or restrictive immigration policies. Much was 
made of the claim that Angela Merkel, in accepting the European duty under international 
law to accept masses of refugees, was indirectly imposing on other countries as well. But 
the Brexit demand for self-regulation is, in itself, the demand that the UK should be 
allowed to regulate refugees and thereby, indirectly, impose on other countries, without 
giving them a say. That may be justifiable, but not as self-regulation. 
 
Again, there is a more sophisticated version of this argument. It says that even when 
problems are transnational they need not be regulated on a supranational level. It would 
be better to resolve them through coordination among individual states, and such 
regulation requires sovereign states. The Leavers made much of the UK’s enhanced ability 
to enter into agreements, both with third countries and with the EU. And indeed, in many 
ways, such decentralized regulation is often superior to supranational regulation. But it 
seems questionable, to say the least, that such coordination is easier from outside than 
from inside the EU. One can well speculate that a vote for Brexit is really largely a vote 
against coordination, not for better coordination. 
 
This is not to say that the EU is the optimal mechanism for coordination. It is not a mere 
coordination institution, and one may well argue that its impulse for harmonization has 
gone too far. But the Leavers grossly overestimate the space for political freedom that 
Brexit creates. In view of existing networks, it will be very difficult for the UK to 
independently negotiate better conditions and, thus, essentially secure more regulatory 
space for itself than would have been possible from within the EU Switzerland and Norway 
are sometimes named as models. But one would think the UK’s ambition goes beyond 
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these autonomy and authority of these countries. Leaving the EU means escaping from 
some outside influence, but it results in the UK losing even more influence. 
 
The Nostalgia of Transnational Law 
 
If the desire to return to the nation state is a sign of nostalgia, then why is it that so many 
people prefer it over transnational law? One answer, I suggest, is perhaps surprising: 
transnational law itself is marred by its own nostalgia. Nostalgia for Jessup can be viewed, 
perhaps, in the frequency with which his book on Transnational Law is invoked as a book 
for our, not its, time. Nostalgia for the European Union can be viewed, for example, in a 
curious statement from 25 June 2016, in which the foreign ministers of the six original 
founding Member States invoked the Community’s founding in 1957 and assure 
themselves of that project’s continued importance.
11
 Both stem from a time that is no 
longer ours. Just as we cannot go back to the 19
th
 century sovereign state, so we cannot go 
back to the mid-century world. 
 
In many ways, reading Jessup’s Transnational Law, like reading statements around the 
founding of the European Communities, is a journey into another time, the era of the Pax 
Americana. That era was influenced by the recent experience of the catastrophe of two 
World Wars, and it was characterized by an emerging Cold War. The first of these 
experiences suggested the risk of nationalism, the second suggested the risk of 
collectivism. Transnationalism and individualism, in the form of free markets, were the apt 
responses. But this describes only what was to be rejected—in that time and in that place. 
Beyond that, both Transnational Law and the European Community were hopeful projects. 
Jessup’s Transnational Law exudes the optimism of its time: problems exist, but they can 
be solved. There is some utopian quality to it, but it is a very finely chiseled and detailed 
utopia. It is a manifesto of a generation that sees big tasks ahead but feels up to resolving 
them, with the right instruments and the right attitude. 
 
It is necessary, however, to consider carefully what these instruments and this attitude 
were. Jessup’s approach to transnational law was influenced by legal realism: He suggested 
that one should start with concrete problems rather than the abstract categories. What 
was needed was expertise: not expertise in legal doctrine, but expertise in real world 
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problems and their solutions. He trusted institutions and officials to display this kind of 
expertise. He praised Mixed Arbitral Tribunals for their creativity in developing new and 
attractive rules in the lack of established ones, and suggests that national judges should be 
able to do something similar. At least in principle this is still the approach that the EU takes 
in its lawmaking. Most secondary law is formulated as a response to a concrete problem 
that has surfaced. One may well criticize the EU for its narrow focus on the problems 
confronting a free market. One may also claim that the EU sometimes sees problems that 
are not really there. But that does not change the methodological point. 
 
What could be wrong about all this? For one, Brexit demonstrates that governance by 
experts is unpopular. This should not just irrational. David Kennedy demonstrates in his 
latest book some of the problems of expert-based governance and how it can lead to 
injustice.
12
 There are many reasons for this, but the simplest may be this: it is 
undemocratic. Expert-based governance depoliticizes decisions and turns them into 
observable truths. Such depoliticization may have seemed appropriate in view of the 
experience with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Today it has become problematic. In 
the light of such expert opinions it appears that Brexit supporters relied on the power they 
had: they may be wrong, their vote may not even be to their benefit, but at least they are 
able to stick it to what they perceive as the elite. 
 
This leads to a broader problem for transnational law, the problem of democratic 
responsibility. Jessup speaks of the wealth of rules, he speaks of jurisdiction and he speaks 
of choice of law, but he does not speak of accountability. Admittedly, Jessup spoke 
forcefully for international democracy elsewhere.
13
 But even there, this democracy often 
seemed more instrumental than intrinsically good. Democracy was important to fend off 
the Soviet Union (that did not support it, at least in the Western way). But it is not clear 
that it plays a role for the development of transnational law. And as for the EU, its 
democratic deficit has never been fully resolved, and it is not clear that there is enough 
political will to fix it. In many ways, the EU was set up precisely in order to overcome the 
narrow national interests that make their way into national legislation.  
 
Indeed, arguably, this anti-democratic position was once a virtue. In the aftermath of the 
experience with Nazi Germany, the idea of populist control was deeply suspicious, at least 
for Europe. In the European postwar mind, the depoliticization of important questions 
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seemed a good thing: it made it possible to ensure that rational decisions would be taken. 
In this story, what made the postwar world prosper and what made transnational law 
successful was precisely that it held populist control in check. The international human 
rights movement spoke truth to power, even where that power rests in overwhelming 
popular majorities, and even where the “truth” was normative and contestable. The 
emerging transnational commercial law was successful because it was able to free itself 
from democratic state control. And the EU was able to hold national governments 
accountable not just vis-à-vis foreigners but also vis-à-vis their own citizens, an aspect that 
Christian Joerges has emphasized. The disdain for the leave voters is a successor to the 
disdain for Nazi populism. Discord may exist within, not about, the system. This somewhat 
restrained view of democracy is now seeing its limits: people revolt against decision-
making process in which they do not feel represented. 
 
This leads to a further aspect. For Jessup and for the European Union, the focus on the 
individual was closely linked to a preference for competition and capitalist markets. Party 
autonomy has been greatly expanded and private ordering has been celebrated. Not all 
individualism in transnational law has this focus on markets; the human rights movement 
is, in parts, anti-capitalist. Nonetheless, it appears that individualism itself is being rejected. 
In Brexit we see this with particular strength. The hope of many of the Leavers was to 
avoid the harsh individual competition of the common market, in favor of a national 
community, whether in the leftist view of solidarity and the welfare state or the rightist 
view of a racially homogeneous nation. 
 
A final aspect follows from this, and it may be the most important one: Transnational law is 
potentially elitist. Transnational law, like increased Europe-wide competition benefits 
some and injures others—it benefits the British elites and the famous Polish plumber; it 
hurts the British worker. If, as we know, the educated were against Brexit and the 
uneducated were for it, then that may suggest that votes for Brexit were simply dumb. But 
it may also suggest that the EU benefits the educated more than it benefits the 
uneducated. Similarly, it is undoubtedly xenophobic and selfish to oppose human rights, 
including rights for refugees. But it is at least understandable in view of the fact that, of 
course, human rights for some individuals have spillover effects on others. This is a reason 
why we usually do not leave decisions on human rights to a majority vote; the fact that the 
Brexit referendum has such effects is one of the most unfortunate aspects. 
 
The elitist potential of transnational law is no accident. It is a reflection of the new 
stratification of world society, creating a transnational upper class that travels and 
communicates freely across borders, and a national underclass that remains local and 
cannot participate in the benefits of the upper class. In this sense, the solidarity amongst 
nationalists worldwide is not paradoxical. Transnational law, insofar as it concerns 
transnational problems, threatens to be the law of that transnational elite. It may care for 
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the transnational underclass (especially migrants), but not the local underclass. As such, it 
is no surprise that the underclass opposes it. 
 
What Is to be Done 
 
All of this does not suggest that transnational law is dead. The simple return to the nation 
state is not the answer, despite the nostalgia that surrounds it. Transnational problems are 
not solved by national laws in isolation. There is no alternative to transnational law. But we 
must realize that transnational law has a dark underbelly. That underbelly was not so 
visible in the 1950s, and maybe it was not so important. Today it is important and should 
not be underestimated. Transnational law, like any other area, benefits some and hurts 
others. It must be developed without nostalgia. That means that some aspects that are 
often underappreciated must be addressed.  
 
One of these aspects is elitism.  Transnational law, by and large, is a project made by a 
transnational elite, a transnational network of scholars and decision-makers. It is also, 
widely, a network made for a transnational elite, namely those who benefit from 
transnationalism, whether in its market liberal form or its human rights form. 
Transnational law likes to take on the fate of the poor elsewhere—exploited workers in 
Bangladesh, environmental victims in Ecuador. It does not always sufficiently endorse the 
issues of the have-nots at home, especially where these have-nots display unattractive 
characteristics such as racism and xenophobia. This is the problem of exclusion. Market 
liberal transnationalists let the weak collapse. Leftist transnationalists let the xenophobes 
collapse. It is no wonder, then that weak xenophobes most vociferously reject 
transnationalism. The Brexit voters are those who felt excluded, and the disdain that we 
pour on them suggests that they are not wrong in feeling that way. There is something 
charming in the current movement for London to separate from the UK. But we cannot go 
back to a Hanseatic League of transnational cosmopolitan, cities and leave only the 
countryside to the nation states. 
 
The lack of democratic accountability is a second, related problem.  It is not enough to try 
to extend the benefits from transnationalism to the have-nots because they may reject this 
as paternalism—the fact that so many in the UK who oppose the EU are the ones who 
benefit from it makes this clear. This is a particularly tricky challenge. We have come to 
develop our ideas of democratic accountability in the nation state. This is why proponents 
of democracy are among the opponents of transnational law and the EU. If that is not an 
option, then better concepts of actual democracy, self-determination and accountability 
are needed. Transnational law in Jessup’s conception did not provide for this; today it must 
be found. 
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A third problem concerns, ironically, Jessup’s favored approach to problem-solving. The 
realist idea of law as a solution for a problem seemed attractive in many ways. Today we 
realize that it underestimates the symbolic value of law. The Brexit nostalgia for the British 
state is also a nostalgia for the symbolism of nationally made law, which has more 
attraction than Brussels. There is no other explanation for the paradox that the leave 
campaign voted in favor of the supremacy of a Parliament which itself, by a large majority, 
is opposed to the Brexit. The European Union has always hoped to establish an identity 
and a positive image; but its image remains that of a cold regulator of bananas. As 
concerns marketing, transnational law may be able to learn from human rights law with its 
widely shared positive image. But the problem is not merely one of marketing. 
Transnational law must also take seriously that law itself has symbolic power. Law goes 
beyond regulation—it aspires and inspires and expresses a vision of our better selves. 
 
Jessup was aware of the power the have-nots could yield if their problems remained 
unaddressed: 
 
When such issues as we have been describing attain 
certain proportions or degrees of intensity, something 
is done about it. If it is not done by the haves, the have-
nots may resort to domestic violence, or to 





Or to Brexit, one might add. For Jessup, transnational law was the answer to such issues. 
For today’s have-nots today, transnational law is part of the problem. Transnational law 




[The author offers thanks for valuable comments to Jed Purdy] 
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